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The incoherence of  strong 
popular sovereignty
Lars Vinx*
This paper argues that the strong conception of  popular sovereignty employed in the German 
Federal Constitutional Court’s recent decision on the Treaty of  Lisbon is incoherent and 
should not be used as the centerpiece of  a democratic constitutional theory. Strong concep-
tions of  popular sovereignty are usually defended on the basis of  the claim that an appeal to 
strong popular sovereignty is necessary to ground the legitimacy of  constitutional law. In 
fact, strong conceptions of  popular sovereignty eliminate the conceptual space for the idea of  
legitimate law. This thesis is developed through a critical discussion of  Carl Schmitt’s consti-
tutional theory—which appears to be the main inspiration behind contemporary arguments 
for strong popular sovereignty—as well as through an analysis of  the Lisbon decision of  the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.
1. Introduction
In its recent decision on the constitutionality of  the Treaty of  Lisbon, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) relies heavily on a strong 
conception of  popular sovereignty that understands the popular sovereign as a con-
stituent power prior to law. Though the Court upheld the constitutionality of  the 
treaty, it pointed out that, in its view, the principle of  democracy puts absolute limits 
on the permissible extent of  European integration. To establish this claim, the Court 
argues that strong popular sovereignty is essential to democracy, and that the preser-
vation of  democracy in Germany requires that the German people not be deprived of  
their metalegal constituent power through acts of  the constituted powers. Because 
the Grundgesetz undoubtedly shields the principle of  democracy from amendment, 
the Court feels entitled to conclude that it would be unconstitutional for constituted 
powers claiming to act under the existing German Constitution to participate in the 
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project of  turning the EU into a federal state endowed with the power to determine the 
scope of  its own competence, since to do so would infringe upon the constituent power 
of  the German people.
The aim of  this article is to offer a critical analysis of  the conception of  strong popu-
lar sovereignty that is used in the Lisbon decision, and to ask whether that concep-
tion offers a convincing theory of  constitutional legitimacy for a democratic state. 
I will argue that a democratic constitutional theory ought not to be based on a notion 
of  strong popular sovereignty, and that the claim that strong popular sovereignty is 
essential to democracy ought to be rejected.
Let me begin by giving a preliminary account of  what I understand by strong popu-
lar sovereignty. According to the defenders of  strong popular sovereignty, a written 
constitution is itself  legitimate, and thus has the power to legitimate ordinary laws 
enacted in accordance with its rules and constraints, if  and only if  it has been cre-
ated by a constitution-giving act on the part of  the people as constituent power and 
continues to enjoy the people’s tacit support. The people as constituent power is taken 
to exist prior to and apart from all law, including constitutional law, and is taken to 
have the right to give itself  whatever constitution it pleases. All constituted powers are 
held to be subject to and to be limited by the constitutional choice of  the people, while 
the people is taken to retain the power to give itself  a new and different constitution, 
through a renewed exercise of  constituent power, if  it sees fit.
Conceptions of  strong popular sovereignty contrast with weaker notions of  popu-
lar sovereignty. The latter either understand popular sovereignty to be immanent in 
a framework of  constitutional rules that makes political leadership elective and gives 
equal rights of  democratic participation to all citizens,1 or they hold that the creation 
of  a new constitution is, at the same time, an act of  self-constitution of  a new people.2 
Popular sovereignty, in the first of  these weak conceptions, is simply another name for 
well-ordered democratic government, since the will of  the people is identified with the 
outcomes of  a democratic process governed by constitutional law. In this conception, 
there can be no people prior to or apart from constitutional law, and all talk of  the 
people as the historical author of  the constitution is taken to be a fiction without nor-
mative relevance.3 The second, weaker conception of  popular sovereignty attempts 
to make more room for the idea that the people can, in a normatively relevant sense, 
1 Kant describes the state as “a union of  a multitude of  human beings under laws of  right” and reserves 
the term “sovereignty” for the legislative power in the state which “can belong only to the united will of  
the people.” See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of  Morals, in Immanuel Kant, PractIcal PhIlosoPhy 353, 
456–457 (Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996). For contemporary proponents, see John rawls, PolItIcal 
lIberalIsm 271–278 (1996); Jürgen habermas, between Facts and norms: contrIbutIons to a dIscourse theory 
oF law and democracy 82–131 (William Rehg trans., 1998).
2 In Rousseau’s words, the process of  democratic constitution making is “the act by which a people becomes 
a people”; see Jean-Jacques rousseau, the socIal contract and the FIrst and second dIscourses 162 (Susan 
Dunn ed., 2002). See also hannah arendt, on revolutIon (1990); aKhIl reed amar, amerIca’s constItutIon: 
a bIograPhy 3–53 (2005). In Bruce Ackerman’s work, the view is combined with the claim that there is 
a need for periodic constitutional renewal through “higher lawmaking” that more directly engages the 
people than ordinary lawmaking. See bruce acKerman, we the PeoPle: FoundatIons (1993).
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be regarded as the historical author of  the constitution. It holds that any truly demo-
cratic constitution originates from a revolutionary moment of  new constitutional 
beginning that constitutes a new political nation, and it argues that the present con-
stitution, if  it is to be legitimate, must keep alive and develop the promise of  freedom 
made in the beginning. However, since the view ties the existence of  a people, as a 
political association, to the continuity of  its constitution, it has no room for the idea 
that the popular sovereign can choose at will to abrogate the existing constitution and 
give itself  a completely new constitution while, nevertheless, retaining its political 
existence and identity.
Proponents of  strong popular sovereignty believe that the weaker conceptions 
miss a crucial element of  constitutional legitimacy. For a people to live democratic-
ally, they argue, it is not enough for it to be governed by a system of  rules that gives 
equal rights of  political participation to all citizens and that can be traced back to a 
revolutionary moment of  democratic self-constitution in the past. According to pro-
ponents of  strong popular sovereignty, the very existence of  a people as a political 
community is tied inseparably to a particular political identity that is prior to all law, 
including constitutional law. A positive constitution, therefore, can be legitimate—
and give legitimacy to the ordinary laws enacted in accordance with its rules and 
constraints—only if  and only for as long as it expresses adequately that particular 
identity in a concrete institutional form. And to enjoy genuine self-determination, 
the people, as constituent power above all law, must always remain the sovereign 
judge of  whether this is indeed the case. Any conception of  popular sovereignty, 
therefore, that takes the existence of  the people as a political community to be bound 
to a particular positive constitution or a particular normative framework should con-
sequently be rejected, for the reason that any constitution based on or interpreted 
through such a conception of  popular sovereignty will thwart a people’s democratic 
self-determination and thus be illegitimate.
I will argue that strong popular sovereignty is an incoherent notion. Strong popu-
lar sovereignty purports to offer an account of  what makes law legitimate, and its 
attractiveness depends, to a large extent, on the fact that it appears to offer an appeal-
ing account. But in truth, strong popular sovereignty necessarily fails to ground the 
legitimacy of  law, since the conception of  sovereignty involved in strong popular sov-
ereignty implies, really, that there can be no legitimate law.
The reason for this, in a nutshell, is that the function of  legitimate law is to reconcile 
us to the heteronomy that we inevitably suffer in political community, where people 
who differ in their values, preferences, and opinions must somehow take collective 
decisions that can never fully satisfy all. However, proponents of  strong popular sover-
eignty, if  push comes to shove, reject the political project of  reconciliation of  difference 
through legitimate law in favor of  the idea that laws are only justified as long as they 
faithfully express an antecedent shared identity. However, if  we agree what is to be 
done because we already share a thick, value-laden identity we do not need to appeal 
to legitimacy. And if  we do not share such an identity, then a conception of  strong 
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The argument of  the paper will be developed in two stages. In a first step, I will pres-
ent a general argument for the incoherence of  strong popular sovereignty based on 
a critical discussion of  Carl Schmitt’s constitutional theory. Though strong popular 
sovereignty may not have originated with Schmitt,4 he certainly presented the most 
sophisticated and influential statement of  the view, and he is clearly the major inspira-
tion for contemporary proponents of  strong popular sovereignty.5 Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to use his views as the target against which to mount the general chal-
lenge to strong popular sovereignty. In the second half  of  the paper, I will return to 
the verdict of  the Bundesverfassungsgericht on the constitutionality of  the Treaty of  
Lisbon.6 I will show that the reasoning of  the Federal Constitutional Court relies on 
a notion of  strong popular sovereignty akin to Schmitt’s, and I will go on to argue 
that the Court’s argument is undermined by the incoherence of  strong popular sover-
eignty. By way of  conclusion, I will offer a brief  defense of  the view that the principle 
of  democracy, rightly understood, does not put any absolute limits on the justifiability 
of  continuing European integration.
2. The incoherence of  popular sovereignty in Schmitt
The appeal of  strong popular sovereignty rests largely on the fact that it appears to 
offer an attractive account of  what makes law legitimate. Carl Schmitt’s presenta-
tion of  strong popular sovereignty is a clear case in point.7 Schmitt tries to defend 
strong popular sovereignty by arguing that those who deny it will inevitably lack the 
resources to explain how law can be legitimate. This claim is central to Schmitt’s well-
known polemic against Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of  Law.8
The Pure Theory of  Law denies that the concept of  constituent power is a legally 
meaningful concept. Kelsen holds that it is impossible for human beings to enact law 
without having been legally authorized to do so by an already existing basic norm or 
by other norms derived from a basic norm. The law, according to Kelsen, necessarily 
starts with a basic norm, not with a metalegal yet authoritative political will, and it 
4 Schmitt himself, though perhaps wrongly, sources the view to Sieyès. See emmanuel-Joseph sieyès, 
Qu’est-ce que le Tiers État? [What is the Third Estate?], in emmanuel-JosePh sIeyès, ÉcrIts PolItIques [PolItIcal 
wrItIngs] 115, 158–169 (Roberto Zapperi ed., 1994). Sieyès likely understood the will of  the people to be 
bound to standards of  natural law, a restriction that Schmitt would reject.
5 See carl schmItt, constItutIonal theory 59–166 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008). For recent adaptations 
of  Schmitt’s conception of  strong popular sovereignty, see andreas Kalyvas, democracy and the PolItIcs oF 
the extraordInary: max weber, carl schmItt, and hannah arendt 79–186 (2008); Paul w. Kahn, PolItIcal 
theology: Four new chaPters on PolItIcal theology (2011).
6 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009.
7 The problem of  the legitimacy of  law has frequently been identified as the core problem in Schmitt’s work. 
See hasso hoFmann, legItImItät gegen legalItät. der weg der PolItIschen PhIlosoPhIe carl schmItts [legItImacy 
agaInst legalIty. the develoPment oF carl schmItt’s PolItIcal PhIlosoPhy] (2002) and davId dyzenhaus, 
legalIty and legItImacy: carl schmItt, hans Kelsen and hermann heller In weImar 38–101 (1997).
8 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 63–65; carl schmItt, PolItIcal theology: Four chaPters 
on the concePt oF sovereIgnty 18–21 (George Schwab trans., 2006); carl schmItt, der hüter der verFassung 
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regulates its own creation and application.9 It follows that there can be no constituent 
power that is outside of  the law but that, nevertheless, has the authority to create law. 
If  there is such a thing as a people, endowed with a legislative will, it must itself  be a 
creature of  law.10 The only way to make sense of  talk of  sovereignty, therefore, is to 
understand the doctrine of  sovereignty as a confused perception of  the autonomy of  
law.11 The autonomy of  positive law makes it both impossible and unnecessary to try 
to answer questions concerning the validity of  law with reference to metalegal facts. 
And since Kelsen regards the validity of  law and the normativity of  law to be the same 
thing, he takes it to be both impossible and unnecessary to answer questions about the 
normativity of  law with reference to metalegal facts. Since a society’s constitution is a 
part of  its legal system, the analysis of  positive law provides a sufficient answer to all 
questions about the law that might concern constitutional jurisprudence.12
Kelsen’s conception of  legal normativity has given rise to serious difficulties of  
understanding that need not be discussed here.13 What is relevant for our purposes is 
how Schmitt understood it. Schmitt argues that if  we hold that the law is normative, 
and if  we take the law’s normativity to be grounded in a basic norm (and not on a 
metalegal political will), we must consider the law to be morally justified, in the sense 
of  being morally correct.14 As a result, Schmitt takes “normativist” legal positivists 
like Kelsen to be implicitly committed to the view that citizens and officials are morally 
bound by the decisions regarding legal or constitutional problems that are mandated 
by the positive law.15 However, Kelsen, as Schmitt rightly observes, explicitly holds that 
the basic norm is nothing more than a bare authorization of  legislative acts that does 
not predetermine the content of  law in any way, so that the law can take any content, 
however unjust.16 Given this background, Schmitt’s major criticism of  the Pure Theory 
of  Law seems highly plausible. Schmitt argues that merely the fact that some decision 
has a legal basis, in a Kelsenian sense, cannot possibly entail that the decision in ques-
tion is morally binding on citizens and officials. After all, a system of  governance, by 
Kelsen’s own apparent admission, may qualify as a legal system, and yet be nothing 
9 See hans Kelsen, IntroductIon to the Problems oF legal theory: a translatIon oF the FIrst edItIon oF the reIne 
rechtslehre or Pure theory oF law 55–75 (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson & Stanley Paulson trans., 1992).
10 See Kelsen, vom wesen und wert der demoKratIe, supra note 3, at 14–18.
11 See hans Kelsen, das Problem der souveränItät und dIe theorIe des völKerrechts. beItrag zu eIner reInen 
rechtslehre [the Problem oF sovereIgnty and the theory oF InternatIonal law. a contrIbutIon to a Pure theory 
oF law] 85–101 (1920).
12 See hans Kelsen, der sozIologIsche und der JurIstIsche staatsbegrIFF. KrItIsche untersuchung des verhältnIsses 
von staat und recht [the socIologIcal and the JurIstIc concePt oF the state. a crItIcal InvestIgatIon oF the 
relatIonshIP oF state and law] (1928).
13 For a helpful overview see Stanley L. Paulson, Introduction, in hans Kelsen, IntroductIon to the Problems oF 
legal theory, supra note 9, at xvii–xlii. A particularly illuminating analysis in JosePh raz, The Purity of  the 
Pure Theory, in the authorIty oF law: essays on law and moralIty 293–312 (2009).
14 This view is firmly entrenched in German jurisprudence and it is still defended by authors who have 
no sympathies whatsoever for Schmitt. See robert alexy, begrIFF und geltung des rechts [the concePt and 
valIdIty oF law] 154–197 (1994).
15 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 63–64.
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more than an organization of  hideous oppression. Nevertheless, to hold that all law 
is normative, Schmitt concludes, and thus to imply that it deserves to be obeyed, is to 
reduce legitimacy to legality and to turn the law into a mere instrument of  power.17
The standard reply to this kind of  attack on legal positivism among contemporary 
defenders of  positivism is to challenge Schmitt’s assumption, that is, to deny that a 
conception of  law that grounds the validity of  law on a basic norm or “rule of  rec-
ognition,” and not on a metalegal political will, must take the law as making a justi-
fied claim to moral correctness. H. L. A. Hart has shown, according to contemporary 
positivists, how to conceive of  legal systems as rule-based systems, and how to avoid 
a reduction of  legal validity to the mere threat of  punishment at the hands of  an 
all-powerful sovereign, while holding onto a clear distinction between legal validity 
and moral correctness.18 Contemporary positivists are, therefore, happy to affirm the 
autonomy of  positive law and to embrace emphatically the severance of  legality and 
legitimacy. They typically emphasize that the fact that some decision is legal does not 
in itself  tell us much about whether it merits our deference or compliance.19 The claim 
that positivism reduces legitimacy to legality is thus seen as misguided. The charge is 
relevant only against versions of  positivism that take the law to be essentially legiti-
mate. However, according to those who share Hart’s approach, this view is simply not 
a part of  modern legal positivism. Some law is morally good, some morally bad, and it 
is a task for normative political and moral theorists, not for descriptive legal theorists, 
to figure out which is which.20
This perspective can easily be extended to the constitutional level. Some constitu-
tional law is good, insofar as it sufficiently protects important values or rights and 
organizes political decision making in such a way as to enhance the chance of  morally 
justifiable outcomes, while some constitutional law is bad in that it fails to do these 
things. A good constitution, one might plausibly go on to argue, will provide legiti-
macy to the ordinary laws enacted in accordance with it, but a bad constitution will 
not. The need to distinguish a legitimizing legality from mere legality, which lacks the 
power to legitimize, forces us to subject legality, in one way or another, to the tribunal 
of  a moral reason external to law.
Schmitt embraces a rather different approach to the task of  distinguishing between 
legitimate and illegitimate law, one that does not require us to subject law to the tribu-
nal of  moral reason. To avoid appeal to an external tribunal of  moral reason, Schmitt 
denies the autonomy of  positive law. According to Schmitt, the law is not founded on 
a basic norm or a rule of  recognition, and it does not regulate its own creation and 
application. Rather, it is always the product of  a prelegal political will that is not itself  
17 See supra note 8, as well as carl schmItt, legalIty and legItImacy (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2004).
18 See h.l.a. hart, the concePt oF law 79–123 (Joseph Raz & Penelope Bulloch eds., 1994).
19 See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of  Law and Morals, 71 harv. l. rev. 593 (1958); JosePh raz, 
Authority, Law, and Morality, in ethIcs In the PublIc domaIn: essays In the moralIty oF law and PolItIcs 210–
237 (1995); John Gardner, Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths, 46 amer. J. JurIs. 199 (2001); Frederick Schauer, 
Positivism as Pariah, in the autonomy oF law: essays on legal PosItIvIsm 31–55 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
20 For a forceful defense of  the view that jurisprudence ought to be nonevaluative, see JulIe dIcKson, evaluatIon 
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legally authorized to create law.21 The question whether law is legitimate or not, for 
Schmitt, must turn, therefore, on the character of  the prelegal political will to which 
the law owes its existence.22 The question I would like to raise is whether this approach 
is capable of  avoiding the problem of  a reduction of  legitimacy that allegedly afflicts 
Kelsen’s conception of  legality. I will argue that the answer is negative.
My argument, admittedly, rests on an intuition about the point and purpose of  talk 
about legitimacy that Schmitt does not openly endorse, though I think a strong case 
can be made that he is committed to accepting it by virtue of  his professed concern 
to defend the rule of  law.23 The intuition is that legitimacy has to do with arbitrating 
differences of  interest and moral opinion through the use of  fair legislative and adju-
dicative procedures and through the enforcement of  essential normative constraints 
on the exercise of  political power. We would not need to appeal to reasons for the legiti-
macy of  a political decision if  we had substantive agreement on how to act together, 
and we would not need an elaborate constitutional framework capable of  producing 
legitimate outcomes, if  we could count on forever continuing to enjoy such agree-
ment. Appeals to legitimacy become relevant where people disagree, in a situation 
where a collective decision has to be taken, over what collective decision would be just 
or substantively correct, or where the future occurrence of  such disagreement cannot 
be ruled out. In essence, an appeal to legitimacy claims that a collective decision is 
entitled to the deference of  those who disagree with it on the merits, since the decision 
was brought about under certain rules and constraints, rules and constraints that are 
taken to be such that decisions arrived at through their use ought to be accepted as 
binding by all. If  a set of  rules and constraints carries this authority, and if  it is recog-
nized to do so, it will allow even those who disagree on substantive issues of  policy to 
cooperate peacefully.24
21 In Schmitt’s own memorable phrase, in a state of  exception “authority proves that to produce law it need 
not be based on law” (schmItt, PolItIcal theology, supra note 8, at 13).
22 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 136.
23 Schmitt frequently presented his arguments as growing from a concern to analyze the conditions of  the 
legitimacy of  the rule of  law. See for example schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at169–252; 
schmItt, legalIty and legItImacy, supra note 17. The concern is equally central to Schmitt’s conceptions 
of  dictatorship and judicial review. See Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur des Reichspräsidenten nach Artikel 48 
der Weimarer Verfassung [The Dictatorship of  the President of  the Reich under Article 48 of  the Weimar 
Constitution], in carl schmItt, dIe dIKtatur. von den anFängen des modernen souveränItätsgedanKens bIs zum 
ProletarIschen KlassenKamPF [dIctatorshIP. From the orIgIns oF the modern Idea oF sovereIgnty to ProletarIan 
class struggle] 211, 250–251 (1928); carl schmItt, der hüter der verFassung, supra note 8, at 22–28. 
Schmitt’s thinking on the legitimacy of  legality can be traced back to his earliest works. See carl schmItt, 
gesetz und urteIl. eIne untersuchung zum Problem der rechtsPraxIs [statute and Judgment. an InquIry Into the 
Problem oF legal PractIce] (C. H. Beck 1969) (1912).
24 For a more systematic presentation of  this idea of  legitimacy, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of  the Case against 
Judicial Review, 115 yale l.J. 1346, 1386–1387 (2006). I take the conception of  legitimacy outlined here 
to be central to the modern tradition of  liberal political theory. It is implicit, for example, in Hobbes’s claim 
that the parties to a social contract are bound to accept the will of  the sovereign as standing in for their own, 
irrespective of  whether they accept the sovereign’s decisions as substantively correct. See thomas hobbes, 
levIathan 32–33, 111–115, 120–121, 124 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996). It also underpins Max Weber’s legal 
sociology, though its Weberian use is, of  course, purely descriptive. See max weber, economy and socIety: an 
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How does this understanding of  the function and purpose of  legitimacy (and thus, 
for Schmitt, of  legal governance) apply to Schmitt’s conception of  the legitimacy of  
law? Schmitt’s view would have to be, presumably, that positive legality will carry 
legitimacy—and thus be able to bridge differences of  interest or moral opinion—if  and 
only if  the constitution that governs the creation of  all ordinary positive law has been 
enacted through an exercise of  strong popular sovereignty and continues to enjoy the 
tacit support of  the popular sovereign.25 In what follows, I will argue that this concep-
tion of  legitimacy is incoherent. A short overview of  Schmitt’s constitutional theory 
will provide the background for my argument.
A constitution, according to Schmitt, is the product of  an act of  collective self-determina-
tion by which an already existing political community expresses its prelegal political iden-
tity in institutional form.26 Schmitt consequently holds that the act of  constitution giving 
cannot take the form of  a social contract or agreement between different social groups.27 
If  constitution giving presupposes the political existence of  a people defined by a shared 
identity, instead of  constituting a people, it must take the form of  a unilateral and revis-
able choice on the part of  the people. The constitution binds constituted powers that act 
under it; however, it cannot bind the people itself, which retains the power to create a new 
constitution through a renewed exercise of  constituent power.28 The basic principle of  con-
stitutional legitimacy, in other words, is the principle of  collective autonomy, understood 
as the right of  an already existing people freely to choose its own form of  institutional life. 
The root of  constitutional illegitimacy, on the other hand, is collective heteronomy, which 
obtains in a situation where a people is forced to live under a normative framework that is 
not (or not fully) the result of  its own choice or that denies its inalienable constituent power.
Crucially, Schmitt sees full collective autonomy and heteronomy as exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive alternatives, and he assimilates all the ways in which a people might be 
subject to a legal order not under its own complete control to the brute denial of  self-deter-
mination.29 In Schmitt’s view, there can be no legitimate coexistence of  different nations 
with differing political identities under equal but binding terms of  supranational law cre-
ated by mutual accord.30 What is more, the view also implies that a domestic constitution 
that is the product of  a compromise among different groups—groups that each have their 
own political identity—and not the product of  an exercise of  strong popular sovereignty, 
can be nothing more than a veiled form of  subjection of  one group to another.31
25 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 136–139.
26 See id. at 75–77.
27 See id. at 112–113.
28 See id. at 127–9, 140–146.
29 See carl schmItt, the concePt oF the PolItIcal. exPanded edItIon 45–53 (George Schwab trans., 2007).
30 See Carl Schmitt, Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes [The Core Question of  the League of  Nations], in carl schmItt, 
FrIeden oder PazIFIsmus? arbeIten zum völKerrecht und zur InternatIonalen PolItIK, 1924–1978 [Peace or PacIFIsm? 
worKs on InternatIonal law and InternatIonal PolItIcs, 1924–1978] 73–193 (Günther Maschke ed., 2005).
31 See Carl Schmitt, Staatsethik und pluralistischer Staat [State Ethcis and the Pluralist State], in carl schmItt, 
PosItIonen und begrIFFe Im KamPF mIt weImar—genF—versaIlles, 1923–1939 [PosItIons and concePts In the 
struggle wIth weImar—genF—versaIlles, 1923–1939] 161–165 (1988); schmItt, legalIty and legItImacy, 
supra note 17; carl schmItt, the levIathan In the state theory oF thomas hobbes. meanIng and FaIlure oF a 
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Schmitt’s tendency to assimilate every form of  subjection of  a people to a law it has 
not autonomously chosen and that it cannot abrogate at will to heteronomy stems 
from his legal decisionism.32 Schmitt’s legal decisionism claims that a legal norm will 
acquire a clear meaning only in a concrete context of  application. And the decision in 
a concrete context of  application, Schmitt thinks, may owe as much to the decisions 
of  the interpreter of  the legal norm as to the norm itself. Someone who is subject to 
a legal system, then, is never merely subject to its laws. He or she is also, and more 
importantly, subject to those who apply them. This is not a problem, Schmitt holds, 
as long as those who interpret and apply the law as well as those who are subject to it 
share the same political identity. The sharing of  identity will entail normative agree-
ment between interpreters and subjects and, thus, give determinacy and predictabil-
ity to the law, despite the fact that abstract legal rules underdetermine their concrete 
applications.33 However, decisionism inevitably becomes a problem of  legitimacy if  
those who apply the law and those who are subject to it do not share the same political 
identity, as is likely the case in the sphere of  international politics or in the sphere of  
constitutional politics in a polity divided into different social groups with profoundly 
different political identities. In such a scenario, subjection to the law will turn into a 
veiled form of  subjection to an alien political will, a will that abuses the law for its own 
political purposes, to suppress political dissent.34
Schmitt goes so far as to claim that a people or nation exists as a political commu-
nity only while it enjoys uncompromised collective self-determination and is free from 
all subjection to law not fully under its own volitional control.35 Political communities, 
in contrast to individual human beings, do not have biological existence. Hence, the 
existence of  a political community cannot, as in the case of  the individual who sub-
jects herself  to a state to protect her biological existence, be separated from self-deter-
mination. The life of  a political community can consist solely in its striving to express 
or to manifest its particular identity in a self-chosen institutional form.36 For a political 
community to acquiesce in its subjection to a law that is not fully its own—that is, to 
acquiesce in subjection to a law that is not created by itself  alone, not open to unilat-
eral abrogation, and not applied by its own members—is the same thing as its having 
lost, or never having attained, the quality of  political community.37 To ask a political 
community to abandon full self-determination and to subject itself  to some suprana-
tional authority is to demand that it commit political suicide, a demand that a politi-
cal community may always justifiably reject. The existence of  political community, 
32 For Schmitt’s decisionism, see schmItt, PolItIcal theology, supra note 8, at 5–35; schmItt, gesetz und urteIl, 
supra note 23.
33 See schmItt, gesetz und urteIl, supra note 23, at 68–114; William E. Scheuerman, Legal Indeterminacy and 
the Origins of  Nazi Legal Thought: The Case of  Carl Schmitt, in 17 hIst. Pol. thought 57 (1996).
34 See schmItt, the concePt oF the PolItIcal, supra note 29, at 26–27, 66–67.
35 See id. at 45–53.
36 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 125.
37 schmItt, the concePt oF the PolItIcal, supra note 29, at 54: “If  a people no longer possesses the energy or 
the will to maintain itself  in the sphere of  politics, the latter will not thereby vanish from the world. Only 
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Schmitt holds, does not itself  stand in need of  external justification. A political com-
munity has a right to preserve itself, and to do whatever seems necessary for its self-
preservation, as much as any individual in a state of  nature.38
If  a people is to possess a political identity that is available prior to all legal or consti-
tutional order, Schmitt has to explain what makes for the prelegal political existence of  
a people.39 Schmitt argues that the identity of  a political community must be based on 
a concrete or particular marker of  collective identity. The markers of  collective iden-
tity that may come to constitute political community are many; they can be ethnic, 
linguistic, religious, cultural, economic, and so on. What turns any such marker of  
identity into the basis of  a prelegal political identity is that it forms the primary basis 
of  identification for a group of  people. And a basis for group identification is primary, 
according to Schmitt, if  and only if  it has the power to give rise to a friend-enemy dis-
tinction, in effect, if  people are willing to fight and die in defense of  the form of  life that 
constitutes the substance of  the group’s political existence. Hence the notorious claim 
that “the political” is defined by the distinction between friend and enemy.40
The resulting political hostility is directed against all those who are not members of  
the group because they do not share the identity that defines it. To protect its auton-
omy, and thus to maintain its existence, Schmitt claims, a political community must 
defend itself  on two fronts: on the one hand, against internal enemies who under-
mine a people’s capacity to fight for its autonomy, by weakening the basis of  its collec-
tive identity,41 and, on the other hand, against external enemies seeking to force it to 
accept a form of  life not of  its own choice.42
Schmitt is at pains to point out that political hostility does not entail the perma-
nence of  open external war or of  violent civil strife. Much like Hobbes, he holds that 
the nature of  war does not consist in open fighting but in the potential for violent 
conflict.43 Nonetheless, Schmitt’s view clearly does imply that an unrestricted jus ad 
bellum against external enemies, as well as a right to set aside the constitution at its 
discretion in order to fight internal enemies, are among the essential prerogatives of  a 
political community. The law’s protections, therefore, apply only to those who fit into 
the identity of  the people and who are willing to accept the polity as the primary com-
munity entitled to dispose of  their lives.44 The process of  constitution giving, therefore, 
presupposes that the question of  the identity of  the people has been settled and that 
internal enemies of  the people who do not fit in have been removed and that external 
enemies have been successfully repelled.45
38 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 75–77.
39 This is the question Schmitt tries to answer in the concePt oF the PolItIcal.
40 See schmItt, the concePt oF the PolItIcal, supra note 29, at 25–37.
41 See id. at 37–45 and the texts quoted in supra notes 30 & 31.
42 See id. at 45–53.
43 See id. at 33–34.
44 See id. at 46–48.
45 Schmitt argues that democratic equality presupposes homogeneity in political identity. See carl schmItt, 
the crIsIs oF ParlIamentary democracy 8–17 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 1988); schmItt, constItutIonal theory, 
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A comprehensive evaluation of  the different elements of  Schmitt’s legal and politi-
cal theory is beyond the scope of  this paper. However, our thumbnail account should 
suffice to address the question whether Schmitt manages to avoid a reduction of  legit-
imacy. The answer, I believe, is negative. Instead of  reducing legitimacy to legality, 
Schmitt performs an even more problematic reduction of  legitimacy to identity.
Schmitt’s notion of  strong popular sovereignty embeds an extreme rejection of  the 
possibility of  legitimate conflict resolution through law. We either agree about how 
our community’s moral identity is to be understood and about how it is to be run or 
we disagree. But every nontrivial disagreement raises the specter of  the political and 
is, therefore, not open to legal resolution. Any attempt to impose a legal resolution 
on a truly political conflict, Schmitt thinks, can be nothing more than a particularly 
perfidious political weapon that tries to deny the enemy’s right to defend his own polit-
ical existence as he sees fit.46 Constitutional law can, therefore, never provide legiti-
macy for collective decisions that are to be taken for and by a collective that contains 
social groups divided by profound differences in moral opinion or political identity.47 
International law, for the same reasons, can never legitimately offer authoritative 
arbitration among several nations differing in political identity.48
One of  the most troubling symptoms of  Schmitt’s reduction of  legitimacy to iden-
tity is that his constitutional theory fails to provide any very interesting reason for why 
a constituted constitutional system ought to be democratic, in the usual sense of  the 
term. Presumably, Schmitt’s conception of  strong popular sovereignty implies that the 
fact that a state’s constitution might accord equal democratic rights to all those who 
are subject to it would not suffice to justify it if  it were not also chosen by the people 
acting as constituent power and did not also express a preexisting, homogeneous iden-
tity. And if  a constitution were chosen by the people as constituent power yet failed 
to accord equal democratic rights to all those who are subject to it then that, or so it 
appears, would not show that the constitution must be unjustified. It would merely 
imply, as Schmitt himself  explicitly suggests, that those not given equal rights simply 
do not belong to the people.49
Schmitt’s claim that strong popular sovereignty, and only strong popular sover-
eignty, can ground the legitimacy of  law thus turns out to be a piece of  empty rhet-
oric. Of  course, I will never complain that the law is unjustified if  it is made by people 
who share my own moral identity, for the simple reason that such law is always going 
to reflect my own convictions. Still, this does not entail that the law is legitimate or 
that I recognize it to be so. To recognize the law as legitimate, I would have to hold 
that I ought to defer to the law even in case it did not reflect my own convictions. 
Schmitt, as we have seen, does not think that I should ever assume such a stance. If  
the law does not reflect my own convictions, Schmitt argues, it must have been made 
46 See, for instance, Carl Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Formen des modernen Imperialismus [Forms of  Modern 
Imperialism in International Law], in schmItt, PosItIonen und begrIFFe, supra note 31, at 184–203.
47 See schmItt, der hüter der verFassung, supra note 8, at 36–48.
48 See Schmitt, Die Kernfrage des Völkerbundes, supra note 30, at 123.
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by people who do not share my identity and, therefore, cannot truly belong to my 
own political group but must be, rather, internal or external enemies. Strong popular 
sovereignty, then, simply has no room for the concept of  legitimacy, though the posi-
tion is promoted by Schmitt as a result of  a reflection on the conditions of  legitimate 
legality.50
One might reply that the argument presented here begs the question against 
Schmitt, since it arbitrarily stipulates an understanding of  legitimacy that Schmitt 
may not have shared.51 I do not think that this reply gets Schmitt very far. If  legiti-
macy is reduced to identity, then legitimacy can no longer play the role that typically it 
has served, namely, to allow for justifiable collective decision taking under conditions 
of  nontrivial normative disagreement. This function of  appeals to legitimacy is evi-
dently at the center, for example, of  Max Weber’s famous theory of  legitimacy, though 
Weber is, of  course, uninterested in the normative appraisal of  claims to legitimacy.52 
Hobbes, though he did not use the language of  legitimacy, clearly attributed a simi-
lar function to the authority of  law.53 The concept of  legitimacy, as it is understood 
here, is equally central to contemporary jurisprudential and political-philosophical 
debate.54 Of  course, Schmitt is free to redefine the notion of  legitimacy in whichever 
way he pleases and, thus, to turn a debate about the conditions under which we can 
justifiably expect people to submit to collective decisions they do not hold to be sub-
stantively correct into an apology for a politics of  the violent elimination of  social dif-
ference. However, if  the redefinition of  a political concept simply switches the subject, 
it can no longer be defended on the ground that it makes an important contribution 
to a debate that presupposes the prior meaning of  the concept. And Schmitt—apart 
from excoriating Kelsen for allegedly reducing legitimacy to mere legality—did ven-
ture to make contributions to debates about the conditions of  political legitimacy in 
50 See supra note 23. For a somewhat similar criticism, see David Dyzenhaus, The Politics of  the Question of  
Constituent Power, in the Paradox oF constItutIonalIsm: constItuent Power and constItutIonal Form 129, 
132, 143–144 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker ed., 2007). Dyzenhaus agrees that Schmitt’s view has 
no room for legitimate law, but he argues that this does not signal incoherence since Schmitt did not 
intend to put forward a theory of  legal legitimacy. Rather, Schmitt intended to deny “that legality pos-
sesses intrinsic normative qualities, the kind of  qualities that make law as such authoritative” (id. at 132). 
As far as I can see, Schmitt is not simply making the standard positivist point that law is not necessarily 
authoritative or legitimate. His view of  “the political” as the basis of  law carries the stronger implica-
tion that no legal or constitutional system, however configured, could have legitimating powers. And 
this implication fails to cohere with the major explicit claim about legality and legitimacy that Schmitt 
defended throughout the Weimar years: that law is authoritative or legitimate, for members of  a political 
community, whenever the metalegal social conditions of  its proper functioning are given. My argument 
is that this claim is empty since the metalegal conditions will only obtain where there is no profound 
disagreement, that is, where problems of  decisional legitimacy are no longer an issue. It is important to 
acknowledge this inconsistency, since it undercuts the popular claim that Schmitt’s pre-Nazi works can 
teach us important lessons on the hidden presuppositions of  liberal-democratic constitutional legitimacy.
51 I owe this point to David Dyzenhaus.
52 See max weber, economy and socIety, supra note 24, at 215.
53 See thomas hobbes, levIathan, supra note 24, at 32–33, 111–115, 120–121, 124.
54 See, for instance, Joseph Raz, Authority, Law, and Morality, supra note 19; thomas chrIstIano, the 
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the common understanding of  the concept, as should be clear, for example, from his 
discussions of  parliamentarianism55 or of  the rule of  law.56
Another objection to the claim that Schmitt’s conception of  strong popular sov-
ereignty leaves no room for considerations of  legitimacy focuses on the politics that 
takes place below the threshold of  the political. Schmitt is not committed to the claim, 
or so one might argue, that every social conflict must reach an intensity that raises 
the specter of  a friend-enemy distinction and that puts the dissenters outside the com-
munity. Even in a homogeneous state, constituted by an exercise of  strong popular 
sovereignty, people will continue to disagree about a great many questions that do 
not give rise to political enmity. They will settle such disputes peacefully, by employing 
the procedures provided for in their constitution, which is validated by strong popu-
lar sovereignty. It seems to follow that strong popular sovereignty has room for legiti-
macy, at least where social conflict remains below the threshold of  the friend-enemy 
distinction.
This objection fails once we take a closer look at the motives that might govern peo-
ple’s compliance with political decisions reached on the basis of  constitutional proce-
dure. Clearly, if  a social group complies with political decisions reached on the basis 
of  constitutional procedure not because it considers those decisions to be fair but only 
because it fears to be even worse off  in a situation of  civil war, its compliance below the 
threshold of  political enmity will have nothing to do with a recognition, on the group’s 
part, of  the law’s claim to legitimacy. Hence, one cannot, in that case, hold that strong 
popular sovereignty provides a ground for claims to legitimacy. If, on the other hand, 
people accept an obligation to defer to a decision they hold to be substantively wrong 
on the ground that the decision was taken under a fair procedure, their recognition of  
legitimacy will have nothing to do with the principle of  strong popular sovereignty. In 
that case, it is not the fact that the constitution was created by an exercise of  strong 
popular sovereignty but, rather, the way in which the constitution proposes to deal 
with disagreement that justifies the law’s claim to legitimacy. If  we do not disagree, 
finally, because we share the same political identity, there will be no problem of  com-
pliance and legitimacy will once again fall out of  the picture. If  these are all the rel-
evant options, it would seem to follow that the principle of  strong popular sovereignty 
can never play any role in legitimizing decisions below the threshold of  the political. 
As a result, there is still no room for considerations of  legitimacy.
Schmitt’s stark, exclusive alternative between complete identity and enmity, as well 
as his radical skepticism about the possibility of  legitimate conflict resolution through 
law is not likely to strike us as awfully plausible. Proponents of  strong popular sover-
eignty might try, therefore, to dissociate the idea of  strong popular sovereignty from 
Schmitt’s conception of  the political. But if  we hold that legitimate conflict resolution 
through law is possible, we will inevitably be led to embrace a weak as opposed to 
55 Schmitt tries to offer a list of  the conditions under which parliamentary decisions would be legitimate, 
in the sense of  deserving deference, in schmItt, the crIsIs oF ParlIamentary democracy, supra note 45, at 
33–50, as well as in carl schmItt, legalIty and legItImacy, supra note 17, at 17–36.
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a strong conception of  popular sovereignty. To say that political conflicts are amen-
able to legitimate arbitration through law is to say that legal or constitutional frame-
works can become constitutive of  political community, and that they can be brought 
into existence through mutual agreement, instead of  having to be expressions of  an 
antecedent identity (or, alternatively, instruments of  oppressive indirect rule). And if  
it is desirable for political conflicts to be resolved through the law and not through 
the use of  force, political community ought to be constituted by law. Strong popu-
lar sovereignty will, in other words, become otiose and even undesirable if  legitimate 
conflict resolution through law is possible. A defense of  strong popular sovereignty, 
then, must embrace something like Schmitt’s radical conception of  political existence 
and his thoroughgoing attack on the possibility of  impartial law. The weaknesses of  
Schmitt’s constitutional theory consequently will afflict all conceptions of  strong pop-
ular sovereignty.
Strong popular sovereignty, at the end of  the day, turns out to be a lot more inimical 
to the concept of  legitimate law than the positivist insistence on the autonomy of  law 
that Schmitt set out to challenge. The view that positive law is autonomous robs the 
law of  all inherent legitimacy, but it can still be combined with an account of  what 
accidental characteristics make law legitimate. A conception of  strong popular sover-
eignty, by contrast, denies the very possibility of  legitimate law. These observations, or 
so one would think, amount to a reductio ad absurdum of  strong popular sovereignty 
and show its complete unsuitability for contemporary democratic constitutional the-
ory. I will now argue that this result can be confirmed by critical analysis of  the Lisbon 
decision by the Federal Constitutional Court.
3. Schmitt in Karlsruhe: The incoherence of  
popular sovereignty and the Lisbon decision of  the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht
The 2009 Lisbon decision of  the German Federal Constitutional Court was concerned 
with the question whether the Treaty of  Lisbon, as well as the national norms that 
were to be enacted to implement its provisions, were compatible with the German 
Grundgesetz (GG) or Basic Law.57 The Court took the view that the Treaty of  Lisbon 
did not violate the GG; however, it mandated changes to one of  the national imple-
menting norms. In taking its decision, moreover, the Court laid out a general theory of  
the limits of  the constitutionally permissible deepening of  European integration. This 
theory is based on a conception of  strong popular sovereignty that bears certain simi-
larities to Schmitt’s, though Schmitt, needless to say, is not cited in the judgment.58 
57 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009 (henceforth: BVerfG–Lisbon).
58 In the Maastricht decision, the BVerfG introduced a conception of  the state akin to Schmitt’s by quoting 
Hermann Heller. See robert chr. van oyen, dIe staatstheorIe des bundesverFassungsgerIchts. von solange über 
maastrIcht zu lIssabon [the state-theory oF the Bundesverfassungsgericht. From solange to maastrIcht and lIsbon] 
31–7 (2010). For a critical discussion of  Schmitt’s influence on the Maastricht decision see Joseph H.H. Weiler, 
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The Court’s reliance on strong popular sovereignty, I will now argue, undercuts its 
reasoning. Just like Schmitt, the Court fails to escape the incoherence of  strong popu-
lar sovereignty.
According to the Court’s Lisbon decision, the GG, though it provides a constitutional 
mandate for European integration, does not permit a transformation of  the EU from 
a federation of  states under international law into a federal state. The Court argues 
that the GG derives from the constituent power of  the German people, and it holds 
that the constitutional decision of  the popular sovereign has endowed the GG with 
a substantive normative core that is immune even to the amendment process.59 The 
Court points out that the principle of  democracy is part of  the unamendable core of  
the German Constitution, and it goes on to claim that a transformation of  the EU into 
a federal state through an exercise of  constituted power, such as the power of  constitu-
tional amendment, would undermine democracy in Germany and, therefore, violate 
the GG.60 A legitimate European federal state could only be created through a renewed 
exercise of  constituent power abrogating the GG in favor of  a pan-European consti-
tution, which would have to be founded by a pan-European exercise of  constituent 
power on the part of  the several European peoples acting as one political community.61 
As long as the GG is in force, European integration can only proceed by transfer of  
individual and clearly delimited competences through international treaty, and that 
transfer, the Court argues, is restricted by the principle that the national political level 
must retain decisive influence over core areas of  policy.62
The Court’s argument echoes Schmitt’s constitutional theory. In his Verfassungslehre, 
Schmitt claims that any constitution contains an unamendable core, notwithstand-
ing the fact that constitutions typically, unlike the GG, contain procedures for amend-
ment that are not explicitly limited in scope. Schmitt took the Weimar Constitution, 
for example, to be based on a fundamental decision, on the part of  the constituent 
power, to make Germany a liberal democracy. For this reason, Schmitt argued, in the 
1920s, that it would be unconstitutional to turn Weimar Germany into a socialist 
state through the exercise of  the constitutional power of  amendment, though that 
power was not explicitly limited by the constitutional text. Such a use of  the amend-
ment formula of  the Weimar constitution, in Schmitt’s view, would have amounted to 
an unjustifiable usurpation of  constituent power on the part of  a constituted power.63
The Federal Constitutional Court adopts a similar line of  reasoning in the Lisbon 
decision, claiming that the German legislator, even if  acting under the amendment 
formula, lacks the power to validate a federalization of  the EU. Of  course, the doctrine 
of  a constitutional core has a firm basis in the text of  the GG itself, which might seem to 
speak against the hypothesis that the Court’s argument is inspired by Schmitt. Article 
79 of  the GG explicitly determines that principles embedded in the first twenty articles 
59 BverfG–Lisbon, par. 216.
60 BverfG–Lisbon, par. 246–247, 263–264.
61 BverfG–Lisbon, par. 334, 340, 346–348.
62 BverfG–Lisbon, par. 226.
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of  the GG may not be abrogated through constitutional amendment. The first nine-
teen of  these articles contain a bill of  rights, while the twentieth article protects the 
principle of  democracy. Therefore, it would seem, at first glance, that the Court could 
have based its argument simply on an appeal to textually explicit positive German con-
stitutional law, instead of  invoking a conception of  strong popular sovereignty.
Exclusive reliance on the Constitution’s explicit text, however, would not have been 
sufficient to generate the conclusion that a transformation of  the EU into a federal 
state through exercises of  constituted power must necessarily conflict with the GG. 
After all, the rights and principles ostensibly protected by the eternity clause of  article 
79 are all protected on the European level as well. What is more, it would clearly be 
possible, at least in principle, to endow a federal EU created through the treaty process 
with a perfectly democratic set of  political procedures that provide all citizens of  the 
EU with full and equal democratic rights. In other words, the text of  the GG seems 
open to an interpretation according to which the GG makes it impermissible, even for 
a parliamentary supermajority, to subject German citizens to a supranational regime 
that does not sufficiently protect individual rights and that is not fully democratic, 
while it permits the powers constituted by the GG to participate in the creation of  a 
supranational federal state that lives up to the substantive standards of  rights and 
democracy protected by the GG. In fact, a minority of  the Court had taken precisely 
this softer view in an earlier decision (Solange) concerning European integration.64
In order to ward off  this challenge, the Court’s argument relies heavily on the the-
sis that the principle of  democracy, which undoubtedly belongs to the unamendable 
core of  the Constitution, requires uncompromised German external sovereignty.65 It 
should be clear that the claim that democracy requires full external sovereignty can-
not be based on an exegesis of  positive constitutional law. It is a political-philosoph-
ical claim that must be defended on the basis of  a general conception of  democracy. 
The Court seems to acknowledge this point. It argues, in effect, that the relationship 
between democracy and external sovereignty is grounded in the nature of  democracy, 
so that it is in principle impossible for there to be a democracy that does not enjoy full 
external sovereignty. And because democracy, in the view of  the Court, essentially 
requires full external sovereignty to turn the EU into a federal state, however demo-
cratic in its procedures, would be unconstitutional under the GG without a renewed 
exercise of  constituent power.
The reason why, in the Court’s view, democracy essentially requires unrestricted 
external sovereignty is that any infringement of  external sovereignty would infringe 
upon the constituent power of  the people.66 In other words, external sovereignty is 
essential to democracy because strong popular sovereignty is. According to the Court, 
the German people’s political existence implies that the German people, if  it so chooses, 
can give itself  a new constitution that overturns the GG and all the decisions derived 
from it. Constituted powers acting under the GG, by contrast, cannot have a mandate 
64 See van oyen, dIe staatstheorIe des bundesverFassungsgerIchts, supra note 58, at 14–16.
65 BverfG–Lisbon, par. 246–248.
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to deprive the German people of  its preconstitutional power to decide for itself  on its 
own form of  political life. Any attempt by the constituted powers to turn Germany 
into a part of  a European federal state that has the power to determine its own com-
petences, and from which unilateral exit is no longer possible, would therefore be ille-
gitimate, as it would have the effect, if  successful, of  depriving the German people of  
its constituent power, that is, of  the power to determine its own form of  political life for 
itself.67 To possess this power, the Court seems to agree with Schmitt, is what it means 
for a people to exist politically. The conclusion that democracy requires full external 
sovereignty trivially follows.68
Note that this argumentative strategy has an interesting implication. According to 
the Constitutional Court, it is not just that the Constitution which the German people 
(allegedly) happens to have given itself—the GG—rules out turning the EU into a fed-
eral state; rather, it is impossible for the German people to give itself  a constitution that 
would allow for turning the EU into a federal state. There can be a German constitu-
tion only for as long as there is a German people, and a German people can exist only 
for as long as it is fully self-determining.69 The creation of  a European constitution, 
therefore, would require that the German people decide to put a complete end to their 
own political existence and to become a constituent part of  a European popular sover-
eign that fully supersedes the political existence of  the German people.70
67 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 340. The Court’s use of  the notion of  constituent power stands in tension with pre-
vailing German constitutional-theoretical doctrine, which has tended to side with Kelsen in denying the 
legal relevance of  an extralegal constitutional power. See Christoph Möllers, ‘We are (afraid of) the people’: 
Constituent Power in German Constitutionalism, in the Paradox oF constItutIonalIsm, supra note 50, at 94–101.
68 Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum argue that the eternity clause, given the liberal content of  the 
provisions it shields from amendment, “can only be properly grounded in a cosmopolitan legal system.” 
As a result, they take the judgment, or at least one important strand of  the judgment, to be more open to 
the idea of  supranational democracy than I suggest. See Erik Oddvar Eriksen & John Erik Fossum, Bringing 
European Democracy Back In—Or How to Read the German Constitutional Court’s Lisbon Treaty Ruling, 17 
eur. l.J. 153, 166–167, 171 (2011). However, as far as I can see, neither Schmitt nor the Court would 
agree with Eriksen’s and Fossum’s assumption that an unamendable constitutional core protecting lib-
eral values can only be grounded in a cosmopolitan legal system. As discussed above, Schmitt argues 
in his constItutIonal theory that an unamendable constitutional core is validated by a historical choice 
through which a popular sovereign expresses its particular political identity. Due to the principle of  pop-
ular sovereignty, the core is shielded against being changed by any constituted power but not against 
renewed exercises of  constituent power on the part of  the popular sovereign. See schmItt, constItutIonal 
theory, supra note 5, at 75–81, 145–58. If  applied to the GG, this view will imply that the eternity clause 
is constitutionally validated not by its cosmopolitan content but by a decision on the part of  the German 
people as constituent power that could have validated a different constitutional core (and that may yet 
come to do so in the future). Hence, the fact that the core actually chosen, for now, happens to overlap 
in content with cosmopolitan values is not what gives the core constitutional standing, in a Schmittian 
view. The Court itself  explicitly refuses to disavow this interpretation of  the eternity clause, thus signaling 
that it takes reliance on a Schmittian conception of  the constitutional core to be a possible approach to 
interpreting the eternity clause of  the GG. See BverfG–Lisbon, par. 217. Dieter Grimm explicitly argues 
that giving primacy to cosmopolitan values would amount to a denial of  the popular sovereignty of  the 
German people. See dIeter grImm, souveränItät. herKunFt und zuKunFt eInes schlüsselbegrIFFs [sovereIgnty. 
orIgIn and Future oF a Key concePt] 119–123 (2009).
69 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 231.
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Since this argument claims to be based on the nature of  the relation of  sovereignty 
and democracy, and not on the contingent content of  positive constitutional law, the 
Court takes it to hold for all European peoples, not just for the German people.71 Of  
course, if  no European people can give itself  a constitution that allows for turning the 
EU into a federal state, it must be impossible for the European peoples to confederate 
themselves into a federal state through a process of  “constitutional synthesis” that 
builds on existing national constitutions.72 No procedure based on the exercise of  con-
stituted powers in the several European nations, however consensual and however 
participatory, could possibly generate a European constitution or an EU endowed with 
the attributes of  statehood. For a European state to come into existence, the individual 
members of  the European peoples would have to reconstitute themselves, outside of  
all constituted legal procedure, as a European people able to give itself  a European con-
stitution. Short of  this happening, the EU must necessarily remain a Staatenverbund, a 
mere confederation of  states that retain full national sovereignty.73
As should be clear, the crucial part of  the Court’s argument is the claim that democ-
racy essentially requires external sovereignty, which is, in turn, based on the idea that 
democracy essentially requires strong popular sovereignty. We must try, therefore, to 
understand how the Court justifies this latter claim. To the credit of  the Constitutional 
Court, it does not openly rely on Schmitt’s blunt assertion that true democracy 
requires antecedent homogeneity.74 Rather, it tries to domesticate the idea of  strong 
popular sovereignty by arguing that strong popular sovereignty, or full collective self-
determination, is necessary to give effect to individual democratic rights and thus to 
endow democracy with legitimating power.75
The Court’s argument starts out from a number of  seemingly plausible assump-
tions about the conception of  democracy protected by the GG.76 For a democracy to be 
legitimate, every citizen must have an equal right, the Court argues, to participate in 
and to influence collective decision taking. What is more, the Court holds that since 
democracy entails that the government is held responsible by the electorate, a well-
functioning democracy depends on a robust public sphere that enforces transparency 
in government and in which all important interests and groups have the opportu-
nity to voice their concerns and to be heard.77 These conditions of  well-functioning 
democracy, the Court claims, are not at present satisfied by the EU, since its procedural 
71 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 334, 347.
72 See Jon erIK Fossum & agustín JosÉ menÉndez, the constItutIon’s gIFt: a constItutIonal theory For a democratIc 
euroPean unIon 45–76 (2011).
73 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 229.
74 See the texts cited supra note 45.
75 For a similar argument see grImm, souveränItät, supra note 68, at 99–123,
76 I will not question these assumptions here. However, it should be noted that the Court’s understanding of  
equality in political rights seems to deny the legitimacy of  federal democratic systems of  the sort practiced 
in the U.S. and in the Federal Republic of  Germany itself. See Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: 
Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea, 10 ger. l.J. 1201, 1214–1216 (2009); Daniel Halberstam & Christoph 
Möllers, The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland”, 10 ger. l.J. 1241, 1247–1249 (2009).







T user on 22 D
ecem
ber 2018
The incoherence of  strong popular sovereignty 119
mechanisms fail to provide for rights of  participation that allocate equal influence to 
all European citizens, and since it lacks a robust, pan-European public sphere that 
would be capable of  holding a pan-European government to account.78
The obvious conclusion to draw from these observations, it would seem, is that 
turning the EU into a federal state is presently unconstitutional, under the GG, for 
the reason that the EU is not yet a fully democratic polity but, rather, a regime char-
acterized by a clear democratic deficit. To turn over the issues involved in Kompetenz-
Kompetenz to an undemocratic institution would clearly violate the core constitutional 
principle of  democracy, insofar as it would subject citizens to a regime that is no lon-
ger fully accountable to them. However, this obvious conclusion does not imply that 
it would still be unconstitutional to turn the EU into a federal state if  its democratic 
deficit somehow could be remedied. In other words, the obvious conclusion would not 
support the idea that it is, in principle, impossible to create a true European polity 
without abrogating the GG and other national constitutions through a pan-European 
exercise of  constituent power that, at the same time, would have to signal the end of  
the political existence of  the German people as well as of  all other European peoples.
While the Court does claim that the EU’s institutional framework is currently 
plagued by a democratic deficit, it does not really put a whole lot of  emphasis on this 
point. This should not occasion surprise. If  democracy is understood as the unbridled 
self-determination of  a people, then a polity by definition cannot be democratic until 
its constitution has become the expression of  the political existence of  a fully self-deter-
mining people. However, given this Schmittian logic, if  there ever is to be a pan-Euro-
pean constituent power, it will have to replace the constituent powers of  the several 
nations. The democratic deficit of  the EU must, therefore, continue to exist for as long 
as the German or Polish or Spanish or French peoples continue to exist, regardless of  
how the institutional framework of  the EU might come to be transformed. In other 
words, the EU’s democratic deficit, from the Court’s point of  view, is not a remediable 
defect of  the EU as it presently exists or as it could come to be through exercises of  
constituted powers. It is an essential feature of  a Staatenverbund in which national gov-
ernments and legislators, as representatives of  the several European peoples, call the 
tune.79 The real weight of  the Court’s argument must rest, therefore, on some other 
basis than the complaint that the EU’s institutional structure suffers from a demo-
cratic deficit that could, in principle, be tackled through gradual institutional reform.
So where does the weight of  the Court’s argument come to rest? The Court, it 
seems, slides from the plausible view that well-functioning democracy has a num-
ber of  institutional, communicative, and political-cultural presuppositions that are 
presently unfulfilled by the EU into the considerably less plausible view that these 
78 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 280–281.
79 The Court consequently argues that the EU need not meet the standards of  democratic legitimacy that 
apply in the national context, precisely because it is only a Staatenverbund. See BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 271. 
All this makes the Court’s genuflections to the standard rhetoric about the EU’s democratic deficit appear 
rather hypocritical. See Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe, supra n. 76, 1210; Halberstam & Möllers, The 
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presuppositions cannot, in principle, be fulfilled in a polity not based on strong popu-
lar sovereignty. Since strong popular sovereignty, at least for now, can only exist in 
the context of  the nation-state, it follows, in the Court’s view, that the EU is not a 
candidate for a legitimate democratic polity. Unfortunately, the Court does not make 
much of  an effort to explain why a well-functioning democracy must be based on 
strong popular sovereignty.80 To repeat: if  the problem were merely that individuals 
currently do not enjoy equal and equally effective rights of  democratic participation 
on the European level, the problem should, at least in principle, be soluble by giving all 
European citizens equal rights of  participation and by building a robust pan-European 
public sphere and political culture.
Of  course, even if  such a project were to succeed, Germans or Poles or Spaniards 
would have no assurance against being outvoted by a coalition made up of  members 
of  other nationalities. It is this possibility, or so it seems, that concerns the Court. The 
Court appears to hold that if  the German (or any other) people or its majority could 
find itself  outvoted, on the European level, with respect to an issue about which it 
cares deeply, it would suffer an intolerable condition of  collective heteronomy and be 
deprived of  the constitutionally guaranteed benefit of  democratic rule.81
To be sure, this worry should not be dismissed out of  hand. But it is doubtful whether 
it suffices to justify the Court’s radical conclusions concerning the limits of  European 
integration. To bring out the point, let us focus, for a moment, on the relationship 
between an individual citizen in a democratic state and the political system of  that 
state. The major function of  a democratic system in taking collective decisions, in the 
domestic setting, is its power to legitimate its outcomes. If  I have been given an equal 
opportunity to participate in and to influence a collective decision, and if  my view or 
my group’s view is at least given due consideration by those who disagree, I can no 
longer claim that the majority’s decision subjects me to an intolerable form of  heter-
onomy in a situation where it conflicts with my own view or preference. And yet, the 
German Constitutional Court seems to want to argue that if  exactly the same thing 
happened to me or members of  my group on the European level, I would be subject to 
an intolerable form of  heteronomy. But why should there be intolerable heteronomy 
in the one case but not in the other?
One possible answer to this question is that there is a considerable danger, in a 
supranational state, for people to end up in a situation where they are subject to con-
tinuing discrimination and effective exclusion from political influence on account of  
their nationality, even while they enjoy formally equal rights of  participation. One 
80 The same holds for Grimm’s arguments in support of  the Court’s reasoning. See grImm, souveränItät, 
supra note 68, at 121–123. Grimm confidently announces that democracy is, for the time being, depend-
ent on strong popular sovereignty in a national context. But he seems uninterested in discussing coun-
ter examples to this claim. For one particularly interesting case (Canada) see Fossum & menÉndez, the 
constItutIon’s gIFt, supra note 72, at 177–205.
81 This view is clearly implicit in the Court’s claim that the process of  European integration can only be 
constitutional if  it does not undermine the particular “identity” of  the German people and only if  the 
German Bundestag retains control of  a number of  key legislative issues. See BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 246–
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might also imagine scenarios in which the interest of  a supranational majority made 
up of  members of  various other nationalities is permanently and predictably aligned 
against an important interest shared by the majority of  members of  a particular peo-
ple. If  one were to find oneself  in one of  these situations, the possession of  formally 
equal rights of  democratic participation and even the existence of  a pan-European 
public sphere and political culture might not suffice to protect one from continuing 
domination at the hands of  a permanent majority made up of  members of  other 
nationalities. And, in that case, the fact that the supranational polity operates under 
a democratic institutional framework would, as I happily admit, no longer entail that 
one has reason to consider its laws to be legitimate.82
However, such problems of  exclusion and majoritarian domination are in no way 
peculiar to the context of  a supranational European polity. They have frequently 
occurred and still do occur in the context of  a number of  democratic states.83 If  one 
holds that these problems, in many instances, can be addressed through adequate 
constitutional safeguards in a domestic context, there is clearly no a priori reason to 
think that such safeguards could not be successfully applied in a federal Europe. The 
very multiplicity of  Europe, moreover, would seem to make constantly shifting coali-
tions a likely scenario and, thus, make it highly unlikely that the members of  one par-
ticular nation would find themselves permanently marginalized on account of  their 
nationality. Therefore, the danger of  majoritarian oppression in the European context 
shows no more than that German citizens ought not to be subjected to a European 
order in which Germans are likely to be permanently dominated by other nationali-
ties. This conclusion, much like complaints based on the democratic deficit, falls well 
short of  justifying the Court’s claim that it is, in principle, unconstitutional to compro-
mise German sovereignty to build a federal Europe.
As I already pointed out, not all situations in which one finds oneself  and those 
who share one’s views outvoted by a democratic majority amount to situations of  
majoritarian oppression. In the domestic context, my group will sometimes have 
to swallow the fact that the majority may have a different opinion as to how some 
important problem of  policy should be resolved. As long as my group’s view is heard, 
and as long as we have a realistic chance to influence policy and, one day, to find a 
majority to side with our view, we are routinely called upon to accept the will of  the 
majority as the will of  the community of  which we are a part. So why would matters 
automatically have to be different on a European level? Why, in other words, would 
it automatically be a problem of  democratic legitimacy if  the majority of  Germans 
found themselves outvoted, with respect to some issue that concerns all Europeans, 
82 This is why secession, in some instances, may be justified in a multinational state. See allen buchanan, 
secessIon: the moralIty oF PolItIcal dIvorce From Fort sumter to lIthuanIa and quebec (1991).
83 And not just in multinational states. Even a casual glance at American constitutional jurisprudence, and 
the debate on the legitimacy of  “countermajoritarian” judicial review, should amply suffice to illustrate 
the point. See, for instance, John hart ely, democracy and dIscontent: a theory oF JudIcIal revIew (1980); 
ronald dworKIn, The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise, in Freedom’s law: the moral readIng oF the 
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by a majority of  non-German European citizens? To repeat, it would be a problem if  
there were a problem of  majoritarian oppression on account of  nationality. However, 
it is certainly conceivable that there might be no such problem. Presumably, then, it 
must be the bare fact that the people to whose views I must defer are also Germans in 
the national context, but non-Germans in the European context, that makes all the 
difference. However, why should this bare fact matter? That some of  those who par-
ticipate in taking decisions over us are not like us in some respect should be a problem, 
it seems, only if  there is reason to expect that the difference will lead them to disregard 
systematically our legitimate interests.
Some passages in the Lisbon decision suggest an answer to this challenge that puts 
at least some distance between the Court’s argument and the distasteful view that it 
would be intolerable to have to share decisional authority with foreigners. The Court 
suggests, at times, that it is essential to democracy that the people to whose decision 
one must defer are members of  one’s own nation or share one’s own identity because 
it concurs with Schmitt’s view that those who share an antecedent identity will never 
disagree profoundly over how society should be organized and run. The members of  
a group that has that degree of  internal coherence would have the opportunity to live 
as they please, without having to restrict each other from living in the way everyone 
prefers, for as long as the group can determine itself. Nonetheless, the members of  the 
group would lose that opportunity if  the group had to share one and the same politi-
cal system with others who want to live in a different way. On the assumption that 
European peoples typically exhibit the inner homogeneity that allows for a harmony 
of  social order and individual freedom, it might be better for everyone concerned—in 
the interest of  individual freedom—to retain full collective autonomy on the national 
level.84
The obvious problem with this line of  argument is that it is simply false to claim 
that consensus about the kinds of  political decisions that the Constitutional Court 
thinks should remain on the national level, instead of  being delegated to the EU, are 
uncontroversial on the national level. Disagreement, in Jeremy Waldron’s apt words, 
is an inescapable circumstance of  modern liberal politics.85 To the extent that issues 
such as criminal justice, the use of  military force, decisions on taxation and public 
spending, the size of  the welfare state, the political role of  religion, or the organiza-
tion and funding of  public education are politically controversial in today’s Europe, 
they are not likely to be significantly less controversial on the national than on the 
European level.86 It is precisely for this reason that we rely on a conception of  demo-
cratic legitimacy of  the kind ruled out by strong popular sovereignty even in the 
domestic context. Not even strictly national democracy can spare us the “torment of  
heteronomy”87 that arises from having to defer, occasionally, to the democratically 
84 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 363. For an American defense of  this view, see erIc a. Posner, the PerIls oF global 
legalIsm 80–99 (2009).
85 See Jeremy waldron, law and dIsagreement 159–160 (1999).
86 BVerfG–Lisbon, par. 249–260.
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enacted decisions of  a majority with which we disagree. If  the promise of  complete 
avoidance of  such heteronomy cannot be kept on the national level, it makes little 
sense to reject pan-European democracy on the ground that the promise cannot be 
kept on the European level.
Finally, even if  one were to accept the Court’s argument that every well-function-
ing political community presupposes a shared identity, on some level, one might still 
argue that there is, in fact, a European political identity, since all European states and 
peoples are committed to the principles of  democracy and to securing the standard 
set of  human rights and rule-of-law protections. When Carl Schmitt described the 
unamendable constitutional core of  the Weimar constitution that had, in his view, 
been chosen by the German people to give expression to their political identity, he 
came up with the following list of  general principles: the principle of  (representative) 
democracy, the principle of  republicanism, the principle of  federalism, the principle 
of  liberalism, and the principle of  the rule of  law.88 If  the constitutional identity of  
today’s Germany were to be described at the same level of  generality and abstraction, 
it would not differ fundamentally from that of  any other member state of  the EU.89 So 
whatever the differences in political identity there might be between one European 
people and another, they appear to be the kind of  differences that are grist to the mill 
of  democratic legitimacy in the national context. If  the values that we as Europeans 
already share do not suffice to constitute a common constitutional identity, then the 
demand for collective autonomy will turn out to be based on little more than the nar-
cissism of  small differences.
All told, I do not see how the Court’s claim that strong popular sovereignty is essen-
tial to democracy can be defended on the basis of  a concern to give proper effect to 
individual democratic rights and to endow democracy with legitimating power. The 
Court fails to show that it is impossible for democracy to work in a polity not based on 
strong popular sovereignty. The failure of  the Court’s attempts to forge a necessary 
connection between properly functioning democracy and strong popular sovereignty 
signals a failure to domesticate the Schmittian understanding of  strong popular sover-
eignty. The conception of  constituent power that underpins the Lisbon decision implic-
itly conflicts with the idea of  democratic legitimacy, much as does Schmitt’s own. The 
Court claims to defend the necessary conditions of  legitimate democratic legality. Yet 
at the end of  the day, the Court seems to agree with Schmitt that the constituted demo-
cratic process can never have genuine legitimating force, that it can never bridge non-
trivial differences in political identity. As a result, the Court’s argument does not much 
advance beyond the blunt and implausible assertion that it must be a violation of  the 
principle of  democracy for Germans to have to obey a decision taken by a majority 
made up of  foreigners.
This stance is deeply problematic. The willingness to accord legitimating force to 
democratic procedure, whether on a national or a supranational level, expresses a 
88 See schmItt, constItutIonal theory, supra note 5, at 77–78.
89 Hence the possibility of  European “constitutional synthesis.” See Fossum & menÉndez, the constItutIon’s 
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commitment to the common project of  living together under one law, notwithstand-
ing the fact that we differ in our moral opinions and political convictions. It is this 
commitment that the Court implicitly rejects, both for Europe and, by implication, 
for its member states. This rejection is not based on the familiar complaint that the 
EU presently exhibits a remediable democratic deficit. Rather, the Court is ideologic-
ally opposed to the cause of  European unity because it sees that cause as a threat 
to national homogeneity, which one must assume it takes to be the basis of  justified 
legality. Such ideological opposition to the cause of  European unity, needless to say, 
will resonate with far too many. However, if  my argument is sound, the Court’s posi-
tion should not be dressed up as a concern to preserve the conditions of  democratic 
legitimacy. The view that strong popular sovereignty is essential to democracy is 
false. Therefore, we should turn our attention back to the constructive task of  using 








T user on 22 D
ecem
ber 2018
